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Consent – the key concept that simply does not
work1
Dr Dan Jerker B Svantesson2 and Terrance Sak3 BOND UNIVERSITY
Consent is a key concept in much of the world’s various privacy regulations. One finds it in the 1980
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,4 it plays a pivotal role in the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework5 and in the privacy laws of many countries,
such as Australia.6
The relevance of the concept of consent is typically
such that consent works like a miracle cure for any
alleged privacy violation. If a data controller has obtained
the data subject’s consent, it may, for example, use
and/or disclose personal data it otherwise would not be
entitled to use and/or disclose.7 Further, it may transfer
personal data to a third country where such a transfer
would not otherwise be allowed.8
Despite its widespread use in privacy regulation,
legitimate questions have been raised for years regard-
ing the appropriateness of how consent is gained from
data subjects.
While the details of the type of role that consent plays
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, this article iden-
tifies three common aspects of consent in privacy law
that are unsatisfactory. First, consent is not always
required when it ought to be. Second, where consent is
(emphasis added) required, the requirements are too
easy to satisfy; that is, the benchmark for an acceptable
consent is inadequate. Finally and closely related is the
practical difficulty of actually enforcing the legal require-
ment for consent.
Consent not required when it ought to be
Currently, consent is typically never “the only basis
for permitting the handling of personal information in a
particular way”.9 Instead, privacy regulations commonly
only utilise consent as an exception (emphasis added) to
certain prohibitions, for example, the collection of
sensitive information, use or disclosure for a secondary
purpose, and cross-border transfer of information.10 But
is there really no circumstance under which consent
should not be made the only prerequisite (emphasis
added)? In other words, are there no circumstances in
which it is reasonable to demand consent, and simply
make the relevant data use unlawful where no consent
has been obtained?
Direct marketing is one interesting area in this
context. Looking at Australia, we note that, while not
favoured in the end (presumably due to the expected
increase in compliance costs),11 the Office of the Federal
Privacy Commissioner (OPC) considered requiring explicit
consent before (emphasis added) an organisation is
allowed to use or disclose personal information for the
purposes of direct marketing.12 After all, the Australian
Spam Act 2003 prohibits spamming — which is fre-
quently done for direct marketing purposes — unless
there is prior consent.13
This inconsistency between the privacy legislation
and the spam regulation is made possible by the fact that
the definition of personal information is yet to extend to
information from which its subject is merely contactable
— a spam message can be effected with, for example,
only an e-mail address, which may fall outside the
definition of personal information.
Looking at the ongoing privacy reform in Australia,
the draft Australian Privacy Principle 7 (exposure draft
of privacy reform) — which deals particularly with
direct marketing — does not make consent a necessary
precondition to the use or disclosure of non-sensitive
personal information for direct marketing purposes.
Perhaps the current stance reflects the arguable truth
in the movement that “information wants to be free”,
especially in this digital age. But should the need for
consent be discarded — and thus privacy less protected
— simply to reduce compliance costs in furthering a
relatively non-essential purpose such as direct market-
ing?
Consent requirements too easy to satisfy
While the definitions vary, a valid consent must
typically comprise of two main elements: “knowledge of
the matter agreed to, and voluntary agreement”.14 In
e-commerce, the contradictions with these requirements
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are prevalent. The wide use of lengthy standard form
contracts results in e-consumers rarely having full knowl-
edge of what they consented to, and frequently leaves
them with little choice but to consent if they desire the
underlying goods or services. In other words, goods and
services, and the associated terms and conditions decided
by the provider, are provided on a “take it or leave it”
basis.
Further, the common use of a single “I accept” button
for a mountain of various terms reduces the likelihood
that e-consumers full-heartedly agree with all the pro-
posed terms. While any potential solutions are likely
restricted by the nature and manner in which e-commerce
is currently conducted, this type of bundled consent can
never be acceptable in relation to a basic human right
like privacy.
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC)
was at pains to emphasise that the form of consent
required is “often highly dependent on the context in
which personal information is collected, used and dis-
closed”.15 In the context of e-commerce then, the
non-compliance mentioned above may be given less
weight in determining the validity of a purported con-
sent. It is hoped that in accordance with the ALRC’s
recommendation,16 the OPC will provide guidance which
is particularly relevant to internet transactions.
Another element of consent is that the person whose
consent was purportedly given must have the mental and
legal capacity to consent. For e-commerce, anonymity
on the internet raises an immediate problem — since
e-retailers are seldom in a position to determine their
customers’ capacity, how can they ensure that this
element was met? The OPC stated that despite the
requirement, “an organisation can ordinarily assume
capacity unless there is something to alert it other-
wise”.17 If this is followed, then the anonymity itself
(emphasis added) defeats the peculiar problem that it
posed — since an e-retailer is usually unable to deter-
mine its customers’ capacity, it is unlikely to be alerted
to any lack of capacity. It follows then that there is
almost no threshold for an e-retailer to satisfy this
element. This said, it is unclear whether the OPC had
internet transactions in mind when it so clarified. Under-
standably, a retailer who can observe its customers has
proper basis to assume capacity where no opposite signs
are shown; but where the customer can only be per-
ceived through its online credentials, there is no basis for
either position — thus, the presumption of capacity is
less justified.
In light of the above, a special onus should be placed
on e-retailers to determine the capacity of its prospective
customers prior to contract. While this may seem imprac-
tical at present, Clarke’s suggestion of a mechanism for
“e-consent” provides a good starting point.18
Difficulty enforcing the requirement
for consent
A requirement of consent will have no practical force
if the data subject does not know of the related action
(collection, use or disclosure, trans-border transfer) in
the first place. Similarly, due to the complaint-driven
model of, for example, Australia’s Privacy Act 1988
(Cth), the requirement will be unenforced if the affected
data subject does not know of the need to consent.
In Australia, these possibilities are not purely hypo-
thetical. In certain circumstances for example, a require-
ment for consent can be bypassed based on it being
“impracticable for the organisation to seek the individu-
al’s consent”.19 However, if it is impracticable to seek
consent, then it might well be that any communication to
the data subject informing of the data collector’s conduct
or the data subject’s rights will not actually come to the
attention of the data subject. Consequently, enforcement
will rarely be carried out. Hence the better approach,
notwithstanding any “impracticabilities”, is for privacy
regulation to ensure that the affected data subjects are
properly informed of the related action — if it is equally
“impracticable” to inform the data subject that its right
to consent has been circumvented then the action itself
should be abandoned.
Concluding remarks
Summarising the above, our rather sad conclusion is
that the concept of consent — so central to privacy
regulation around the world – simply does not work. It
makes sense in theory, but the practical application of
the concept illuminates its flaws. First, consent is not
always required where it should be required. Second, it
is too easy for businesses and organisations, particularly
in the online context, to obtain consent, and consent
given in such circumstances is meaningless. Third, the
enforcement of consent-based schemes is often dis-
placed where the data subject is unaware of the consent
requirement.
To this we can add that, when one looks at the
consent regulation from the perspective of business
operators and organisations bound by privacy regula-
tions, it becomes clear that obtaining and tracking
consent is costly and cumbersome.
Combining these observations, it seems possible to
conclude that the consent framework found in privacy
regulations around the world is costly for business and
has the effect of negating the positive effect of substan-
tive privacy laws.
privacy law bulletin October 2010 23
Dan Jerker B Svantesson,
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, and
Terrance Sak,
Law Student, Faculty of Law,
Bond University.
Footnotes
1. Research for this paper was funded by a generous grant from
the .auDA Foundation.
2. Associate Professor, Faculty of Law Bond University, Gold
Coast Queensland 4229 Australia, Ph: +61 7 5595 1418,
E-mail: Dan_Svantesson@bond.edu.au, (www.svantes-
son.org).
3. LLB Candidate at Bond University.
4. 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Preface www.oecd.org/
(accessed 10 August 2010).
5. www.apec.org/, (this can be accessed by clicking on media
releases/2004/Ministers Endorse Privacy Framework) (accessed
12/4). For a more detailed discussion of the APEC framework,
see: Carla Bulford, Between East and West: The APEC Privacy
Framework and the Balance of International Data Flows 3
ISJLP 705 2007–08.
6. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
7. Above at NPP 2.1(b).
8. Above at NPP 9(b).
9. ALRC Report 108 19.3.
10. Above at 19.4–19.7.
11. Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Getting in on the
Act: The Review of the Private Sector Provision of the Privacy
Act 1988 (2005), 103; recommendation 23 was silent on
requiring explicit consent.
12. Above at [102].
13. Spam Act 2003 (Cth) s 16.
14. Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Guidelines to the
National Privacy Principles (2001), 22.
15. ALRC Report 108 19.59.
16. Above, Recommendation 19-1.
17. Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, Guidelines to the
National Privacy Principles (2001), 22.
18. <http://www.rogerclarke.com/EC/eConsent.html> 27 July 2010.
19. For example, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), NPP 2.1(c)(i).
privacy law bulletin October 201024
